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CHRISTIAN SCRIPTURE AND AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: 
AN INSTRUCTIVE ANALOGY? 
INTERPRETING THE BIBLE AND THE CONSTITUTION.  By Jaroslav Pelikan.  
Yale University Press 2004.  Pp. xiii, 216.  $30.00.  ISBN: 0-300-10267-4. 
Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J.† 
INTRODUCTION 
As a Jesuit priest whose ministry includes the teaching of 
constitutional law, I regularly struggle with the task of interpreting two 
foundational normative texts1: the Bible and the U.S. Constitution.  The 
Bible plays a central normative role in the life of the Church, while the 
Constitution provides a normative framework for American law and 
politics.  These texts ground the ongoing lives of both the Church and 
the American political community.  Both of these textually constituted 
communities face the challenge of appropriating for contemporary 
experience a normative text produced in a significantly different 
historical context.  But can American constitutional lawyers learn 
anything from the ways in which the Bible has been interpreted within 
the life of the Church? 
Jaroslav Pelikan, eminent historian of the Church’s doctrinal 
tradition2 and Sterling Professor of History Emeritus at Yale, believes 
 
 † Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.  LL.M. 2003, Columbia Law 
School; J.D. 1988, Michigan Law School; S.T.L. 2002, M.Div. 2001, Weston Jesuit School of 
Theology; A.B. 1985, Georgetown University.  This research was supported by a grant from the 
Perini Family Faculty Research Fund.  I am grateful to Michael Cassidy, Lawrence Cunningham, 
and Michael Perry for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
 1. Cf. Ronald R. Garet, Comparative Normative Hermeneutics: Scripture, Literature, 
Constitution, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 35, 37 (1985) (characterizing the interpretation of normative texts 
as a distinct “species of moral reflection”). 
 2. See Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine 
(U. Chi. Press 1971-89) (a five-volume work); Jaroslav Pelikan, Creeds and Confessions of Faith 
in the Christian Tradition (Yale U. Press 2003) (a four-volume work) [hereinafter Pelikan, 
Creeds].  See especially vol. 4 of Pelikan’s Creeds and Confessions, entitled Credo: Historical 
and Theological Guide to Creeds and Confessions of Faith in the Christian Tradition (Yale U. 
Press 2003) [hereinafter Pelikan, Credo], which examines the use of the Bible in creeds and 
confessions and the use of those creeds and confessions in the life of the churches.  Pelikan notes: 
[t]here is a direct continuity between that inquiry and [his current book], which compares 
the several versions of official hermeneutics that the councils and confessions of the 
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that those engaged in the enterprise of constitutional interpretation can 
indeed learn something from the history of biblical interpretation.  
Drawing on a life-long “study of the twenty centuries of interpreting 
Christian Scriptures,” Pelikan offers his new book, Interpreting the 
Bible and the Constitution, in the hope that it “may be of some help and 
illumination . . . to those who stand in the tradition of the two centuries 
of interpreting American Scripture.” (37)3 
Pelikan brings to this effort a commitment to the idea that using 
“binocular vision” can help both theologians and lawyers to see their 
respective fields more clearly. (36)4  Rather than looking at the question 
of how to interpret foundational normative texts “through the monocular 
of law or the monocular of religion,”5 binocular vision promises to 
enable us to see the interpretive enterprise more clearly by using both 
eyes and the two lenses of law and theology.  What does the use of 
Pelikan’s binoculars bring more clearly into focus? 
Pelikan’s fascinating historical analysis succeeds admirably in 
helping us to see that a striking analogy can be drawn between the 
interpretation of both of these foundational normative texts.  He 
acknowledges that he is not the first scholar to have recognized the 
parallel. (2)6  Indeed, there is a significant body of literature making note 
 
church over the centuries have applied to Christian Scripture with the several versions of 
official hermeneutics that the Supreme Court over the centuries has applied to American 
Scripture. (3). 
 3. Pelikan also promises that “the theme of ‘Christian Scripture and American Scripture,’ as 
a comparative study of methods of interpretation, can be especially poignant, important, and 
instructive.” (18). 
 4. Pelikan developed the concept of “binocular vision” in describing Harold Berman’s 
innovative approach to studying the interrelationship of law and religion.  See Jaroslav Pelikan, 
Foreword to The Weightier Matters of the Law: Essays on Law and Religion xi-xii (John Witte, 
Jr. & Frank Alexander eds., Scholar’s Press 1988).  Given Berman’s example, Pelikan contends 
that “there should now be no excuse for scholars in either field to go on using a monocular instead 
of a binocular.”  Id. at xii.  See also John Witte, Jr., Law and Protestantism: The Legal Teachings 
of the Protestant Revolution 29 (Cambridge U. Press 2002): (“The binocular of law and 
theology . . . brings into focus a considerably wider and fuller picture of the Lutheran Reformation 
than can be seen through the monocular of law or the monocular of theology alone . . . .”); John 
Witte, Jr., A New Concordance of Discordant Canons: Harold J. Berman on Law and Religion, 42 
Emory L.J. 523, 547 (1993): Berman’s “binocular of law and religion” allows us to “gain wholly 
new insights even into sources and subjects that no longer seemed capable of new interpretation”; 
“Through Berman’s binocular, one can see much more in these subjects than conventional 
viewpoints have allowed.” 
 5. John Witte, Jr. & Thomas C. Arthur, The Three Uses of Law: A Protestant Source of the 
Purposes of Punishment? 10 J.L. & Relig. 433, 433-434 (1994). 
 6. Constitutional historian Edwin Corwin, for example, opened a well-known monograph 
with this sentence: “The Reformation superseded an infallible Pope with an infallible Bible; the 
American Revolution replaced the sway of a king with that of a document.”  Edward S. Corwin, 
The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law 1 (Cornell U. Press 1955).  See 
also Michael J. Perry, Morality, Politics & Law 136 (Oxford U. Press 1988): 
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of the analogy.7  Interpreting the Bible and the Constitution makes a 
significant contribution to this literature by elegantly illustrating a host 
of methodological points of contact between the traditions of biblical 
and constitutional interpretation. 
But I have to confess that my initial look through Pelikan’s 
binoculars left me a bit frustrated and bleary-eyed.  Pelikan never 
squarely answers the question that will be in the minds of most lawyers 
and judges who take up his book: Precisely how might this analogy 
prove helpful or illuminating to constitutional interpreters struggling to 
resolve contemporary interpretive controversies with fidelity to the 
normative text? 
Perhaps a definitive answer to that question is not to be expected 
from a project that Pelikan himself describes as a “modest essay,” (4) 
“an effort at a measure of scholarly reciprocity,”8 not intended as “a 
direct intervention in the fray of the current exegetical debates, whether 
biblical or constitutional.” (37)  Yet, even without prescribing definitive 
solutions to contemporary exegetical controversies, Pelikan’s effort to 
elaborate an analogy between biblical and constitutional interpretation 
does ultimately help us to see a bit more clearly how the enterprise of 
interpreting a community’s foundational text ought to be understood. 
Interpreting the Bible and the Constitution reflects Pelikan’s effort 
to explore a “very narrow” question: “What are the means and methods 
 
There is an important analogy between, on the one hand, the role of the sacred text and 
the activity of interpreting the text, in the life of a religious tradition and community, 
and, on the other, the role of the constitutional text and the activity of interpreting the 
text, in the life of a political tradition and community. 
See also Garet, supra n. 1; and Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1 
(1984).  Pelikan, however, contends that most prior considerations of this parallel “focused on the 
question of the authority of the two texts rather than on the question of the proper methods for 
interpreting them” (2) which is the question he has chosen to pursue. 
 7. See Samuel J. Levine, Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and Unenumerated Biblical 
Obligations: A Preliminary Study in Comparative Hermeneutics, 15 Const. Commentary 511, 
511-512 (1998): 
As part of the continuing emphasis on hermeneutics in constitutional interpretation, a 
body of literature has emerged comparing constitutional textual analysis to Biblical 
hermeneutics.  This scholarship has been based on the recognition that, like the 
Constitution, the Bible functions as an authoritative legal text that must be interpreted in 
order to serve as the foundation for a living community. 
See also id. at 511 n. 6 (citing to the literature); Steven D. Smith, Believing Like a Lawyer, 40 
B.C. L. Rev. 1041, 1065-1069 (1999); cf. Jack Balkin, Idolatry and Faith: The Jurisprudence of 
Sanford Levinson, 38 Tulsa L. Rev. 553, 571-578 (2003), discussing Levinson’s distinction 
between constitutional Catholicism and constitutional Protestantism and the dynamics of 
constitutional change. 
 8. This “gift in return” (37) is offered in gratitude for the recent scholarship in legal history 
that “has been making a major contribution to the study of theology.” (36) (citing the work of 
David Daube, Harold J. Berman and John T. Noonan). 
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by which official interpreters read their normative texts?” (36)  His book 
offers us a comparative survey of the “constructions” produced by 
“those who bear official responsibility for binding interpretation” within 
their communities. (33)  Thus, Pelikan seeks to compare the official 
councils, creeds, confessions, and liturgies of the Christian tradition with 
their analogue within the American constitutional tradition, “the 
decisions and opinions of the secular American equivalent of the 
ecumenical council, the Supreme Court.” (33) 
While the question driving Pelikan’s inquiry may be narrow, he 
contends that the authority given these normative texts, along with the 
“magisterial standing” of their official interpreters, makes the question a 
“decisive” one—a question “that can be extremely broad in its 
implications.” (36)  This Article aims to examine the implications that 
flow from Pelikan’s exploration of this “decisive” question. (36) 
Part I of the Article focuses on Chapters One and Two of Pelikan’s 
book, where he discusses the differences and analogies between the 
Bible and the Constitution that provide the foundation for 
methodological comparison.  Part II of the Article will then examine the 
argument Pelikan develops in Chapters Three and Four, where he draws 
on the work of nineteenth-century theologian John Henry Newman in 
order to explore “the fundamental problem of the relation between the 
authority of the original text and the authority of developing doctrine in 
the ongoing life and history of the community.” (75) 
In the course of examining Pelikan’s analogy, I also aim to put 
Pelikan’s methodology of binocular vision to work by tentatively trying 
on the interpretive lenses of two additional scholars who, like Pelikan, 
have drawn attention to the analogy between biblical interpretation and 
constitutional interpretation.  One lens will be provided by the approach 
to biblical interpretation developed by Sandra M. Schneiders in The 
Revelatory Text: Interpreting the New Testament as Sacred Scripture,9 
while the other lens comes from the constitutional theory articulated by 
Michael J. Perry in We the People: The Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Supreme Court.10 
In the end, Pelikan’s binocular view of the history of biblical and 
constitutional interpretation allows us to see that the interpretation of 
such texts has been neither simply an exercise in static traditionalism nor 
an open invitation to freewheeling interpretive creativity disconnected 
 
 9. Sandra M. Schneiders, The Revelatory Text: Interpreting the New Testament as Sacred 
Scripture (Harper 1992). 
 10. Michael J. Perry, We the People: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court 
(Oxford U. Press 2002). 
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from the foundational text.11  Instead, Pelikan’s exploration of the 
methodological analogies between biblical and constitutional 
interpretation implies (without using this formulation) that the process of 
interpreting texts which give rise to living communities might best be 
understood as a sort of developmental originalism which ought to 
manifest “creative fidelity.”12 
 
 11. Cf. Antonin Scalia, God’s Justice and Ours, First Things 17, 17 (May 2002) (“the 
Constitution that I interpret and apply is not living but dead”); Jeffrey Rosen, Modest Proposal, 
New Republic 21, 22 (Jan. 14, 2002) (describing Judge Richard Posner’s interpretive approach as 
a “crude . . . pragmatism that looks to a particular case and presumes to reach a result that, in the 
judge’s view, would be best for the country”); compare Justice Scalia’s opinion announcing the 
judgment of the Court in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n. 6 (1989):  
Because . . . general traditions provide such imprecise guidance, they permit judges to 
dictate rather than discern the society’s views . . . .  Although assuredly having the virtue 
(if it be that) of leaving judges free to decide as they think best when the unanticipated 
occurs, a rule of law that binds neither by text nor by any particular, identifiable tradition 
is no rule of law at all. 
with Justice Brennan’s dissent in Michael H., 491 U.S. at 141: 
The document that the plurality construes today is unfamiliar to me.  It is not the living 
charter that I have taken to be our Constitution; it is instead a stagnant, archaic, 
hidebound document steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a time long past.  This 
Constitution does not recognize that times change, does not see that sometimes a practice 
or rule outlives its foundations.  I cannot accept an interpretive method that does such 
violence to the charter that I am bound by oath to uphold. 
 12. See M. Cathleen Kaveny, Response to John T. Noonan, Jr., in The Catholic Theological 
Society of America Proceedings of the Fifty-Fourth Annual Convention vol. 54, 57 (Michael 
Downey ed. 1999) [hereinafter Kaveny, Response] (noting that lawyers, judges, and theologians 
all share a vocation characterized by the call to “help transmit [their] tradition, attempting to carry 
it forward into new times, places, and cultural contexts with ‘creative fidelity.’”) (borrowing the 
term from Francis A. Sullivan, S.J., Creative Fidelity: Weighing and Interpreting Documents of 
the Magisterium (Paulist Press 1996); M. Cathleen Kaveny, Listening for the Future in the Voices 
of the Past: John T. Noonan, Jr. on Love and Power in Human History, 11 J.L. & Relig. 203, 207 
(1994-95) [hereinafter Kaveny, Listening for the Future]: 
[B]ecause human nature is essentially social, and human society also moves within time, 
those of us who are living today stand in community and conversation with the dead.  
The shape of our minds and hearts is informed by the ideas and purposes of our 
forebears much as the shape of our bodies is informed by their genetic material.  We 
manifest our fidelity to the persons of the past not in slavish repetitions of old formulas, 
but in sensitively attempting to discern the core purposes of traditional doctrine, and 
creatively applying it to a new situation.  Such a process requires us both to understand 
and to judge our predecessors.  In sifting through their thought we must separate insights 
of perduring value from the rough bundle of time-bound presuppositions and failures of 
will and vision which trap them. 
See also Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1247 (1997); 
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 395 
(1995); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165, 1264 (1993) (describing a 
notion of fidelity that offers “a way to understand how originalism can be dynamic without it 
being unfaithful.”). 
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I. CHRISTIAN SCRIPTURE AND AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: FOUNDATIONS 
FOR METHODOLOGICAL COMPARISON 
Pelikan’s interest in exploring the analogy between the 
Constitution and the Bible made an early appearance in his 1983 
Jefferson Lecture, The Vindication of Tradition.13  Pelikan there noted 
that remarks of his late Yale colleague, Alexander Bickel, first prompted 
him to consider the analogy.  Hearing Bickel speak about “development 
of doctrine” in the constitutional context, Pelikan began to articulate the 
implications of employing the technical theological term “development” 
in the realm of constitutional law. (120)14 
Drawing on his own deep study of the development of theological 
doctrine, Pelikan recognized that the Constitution, like the Bible, is an 
ancient authoritative text by which a living community is constituted.  
The official interpreters of both texts are simultaneously subordinate to 
the text as a norm and capable of deciding what the ancient text means 
today.  Moreover, in both traditions, it is to the development of doctrine, 
“far more than the mechanism of constitutional amendment or of 
dogmatic definition, [that] the community looks for guidance that will 
recognize change but preserve continuity.”15 
Those parallels work together to support Pelikan’s analogy 
between the American-Constitutional tradition and the Judeo-Christian 
tradition.  While Pelikan concedes that all analogies are susceptible of 
oversimplification, he nonetheless contends that this analogy is 
“profound and accurate,” revealing that both traditions manifest a 
“capacity to develop while still maintaining [their] identity and 
continuity.”16 
In his current book, Pelikan builds on this insight by characterizing 
the Bible of the Christian Church (Christian Scripture)17 and the 
American Constitution (American Scripture)18 as their respective 
 
 13. Jaroslav Pelikan, The Vindication of Tradition 58 (Yale U. Press 1984). 
 14. The theological sense of the idea of development has its modern foundation in John 
Henry Newman’s An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine.  Id.  Pelikan describes 
Newman’s Essay as one of those “‘works in the history of theology of which we can say that after 
their appearance nothing was ever again quite the same.’” (119) (quoting J.M. Cameron, 
Introduction to John Henry Newman, An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine 7 (J.M. 
Cameron ed., Penguin Books 1974) (originally published 1845)). 
 15. Pelikan, supra n. 13, at 59. 
 16. Id. at 58 (noting that such a capacity is one “mark by which to identify a living 
tradition”). 
 17. Pelikan uses the term Christian Scripture to refer to the Christian canon of the Bible, both 
Old and New Testaments. (14). 
 18. Because Scripture is usually taken to mean a product of divine inspiration that “goes on to 
produce ‘inspirations’ in its readers,” (18-19) Pelikan recognizes that the Declaration of 
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community’s “normative Great Code”: both texts are familiar and 
venerable.  Each text has been adopted by its community as an 
authoritative norm to which official action is expected to conform.  Each 
is intended to endure into the future, capable of application to the 
differing circumstances and unforeseen needs of future times.  Over 
centuries, the words of these texts have been interpreted and 
reinterpreted, generating a body of authoritative commentary, yet neither 
of these texts prescribes the proper method for its interpretation.  Nor 
does either text identify which textual interpreter possesses binding 
interpretive authority. (5)19 
A. Parallel Interpretive Communities 
Indeed, Pelikan notes that both Christian Scripture and American 
Scripture, sometimes in “strikingly parallel” ways, are the concern of 
four distinct interpretive communities, which “constantly interact with 
one another”: (22) 
1.  “We the people in their voting booths and in their pews.” (22)  
Just as Bruce Ackerman can identify “the locus of ongoing interpretation 
of American Scripture in the cumulative experience of ‘we the people,’ 
as reflected in such decisive events of American history as the Civil War 
and the New Deal,” (24)20 so too, Irenaeus and Origen in the second 
century appealed to the authority of the people as the ultimate arbiters of 
Christian doctrine. (24-25)21  In Pelikan’s view, the “consent of the 
governed” as the foundation of the constitutional order finds its parallel 
in the theological notion of the consensus fidelium, which affirms “the 
 
Independence and the Gettysburg Address might be better described as American Scripture than 
the Constitution.  Pelikan, however, insists that it is the Constitution which serves as Scripture in 
American law:  
[I]t is the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, and above all the requirement of “the 
equal protection of the laws” (amend. 14, sec. 1), that has been the subject of controversy 
over the logic of textual exegesis, and therefore of judicial interpretation [in decisive 
cases like Brown v. Board of Education].  And that makes the Constitution the normative 
“American Scripture” in a sense that the Declaration of Independence is not. (22). 
 19. Employing Northrup Frye’s notion of “Great Code.”  See Northrop Frye, The Great 
Code: The Bible and Literature (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich 1982). 
 20. Citing Bruce A. Ackerman, We the People 25 (2 vols., Belknap Press 1991-98). 
 21. (25) (quoting Irenaeus, Rule of Faith of Irenaeus, in Pelikan, Creeds, supra n. 2, vol. 1, at 
50; and Origen, On First Principles 1.4-8, in id. vol. 1, at 64-65).  See also id. at (25-26): 
[N]either patriarchs nor councils could have introduced novelties amongst us, because 
the protector of religion is the very body of the church, even the people themselves, who 
desire their religious worship to be ever unchanged and of the same kind as that of their 
fathers.  
Quoting Response of Eastern Orthodox Patriarchs to Pope Pius IX, in Pelikan, Creeds, supra 
n. 2, vol. 3, at 282 (emphasis added). 
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role of the laity as bearers of authentic Catholic tradition.” (26-27)22  
2.  “The academic scholars of the professoriat with their historical 
research and their footnotes, who are a learned and often quarrelsome 
lot.” (27)  Both the Bible and the Constitution “have generated a 
scholarly tradition, without which it is no longer possible to interpret 
them.” (27)  Yet, this “academification” (27)23 in both traditions can 
create a chasm between the world of scholarship and the world of 
practice. 
3.  “The professional and certified practitioners with their briefs 
and their sermons, in their service to their clients for the day-to-day 
application of the text to the situations of human life.” (29)  
Professionals in both traditions, no matter how creatively they draw on 
their Scriptures, must still be able to make credible use of the normative 
text.  As their communities’ Great Code, both the Bible and the 
Constitution must be interpreted in ways that those whose lives are 
governed by the normative text “will not find arbitrary, even if they 
disagree with it or cannot always follow its reasoning.” (30)  In other 
words, interpreters of both the Bible and the Constitution “must be able 
to convince, not only persuade.” (30)  Interpreters of both texts must be 
able to explain plausibly why their interpretation (however novel or 
unexpected) is, in fact, an authoritative reading of the community’s 
normative text. 
4.  “The hierarchy with their robes and their decrees—and they can 
trump all the others . . . .” (30)  Pelikan contends that the teaching 
authority of the bishops finds its parallel in the infallible, because final, 
authority of the Supreme Court.  Both hierarchies share the serious 
responsibility of interpreting their Scriptures with faithfulness to the 
normative text and the demands of the interpretive enterprise.  Indeed, 
without ignoring the reality that both bishops and judges bring mixed 
motives (political and otherwise) to their interpretive work, Pelikan 
 
 22. The “classic modern formulation” of the notion of the consensus fidelium was articulated 
by John Henry Newman in his 1858 essay, On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine. 
(27)  See John Henry Newman, On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine, in Conscience, 
Consensus, and the Development of Doctrine: Revolutionary Texts by John Henry Cardinal 
Newman 392-428 (James Gaffney ed., Image Books 1992).  Pelikan notes that the consensus 
fidelium, largely as Newman understood it, “achieved official vindication” in Vatican II’s Decree 
on the Apostolate of the Laity. (27)  Newman’s theology of doctrinal development plays a crucial 
role in Pelikan’s comparison of biblical and constitutional interpretation.  See text, infra Part II. 
 23. “The real significance of constitutional theory is, I believe, as a sign of the increased 
academification of law school professors, who are much more inclined than they used to be to 
write for other professors rather than for judges and practitioners.” (27) (quoting Richard A. 
Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, in The Unpredictable Constitution 219 (Norman Dorsen 
ed., N.Y.U. Press 2002)). 
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wants to insist that we consider the possibility that textual and doctrinal 
debates are something more than “mere rationalization.” (35)  The book 
focuses its attention on this fourth interpretive community in both 
traditions—those with official responsibility for binding interpretation. 
B. Sandra Schneiders on Christian Scripture, American Scripture, and 
Parallel Interpretive Communities 
Pelikan’s insight finds support in the work of New Testament 
scholar Sandra Schneiders, who has also noted the strikingly parallel 
ways in which interpretive communities within both the biblical and 
constitutional traditions interact in interpreting their respective 
community’s foundational text.  Looking first to the biblical tradition, 
Schneiders explains that a reciprocal relationship exists between the 
Church and the Bible that plays a central role in biblical interpretation.  
The Church—“the community of the disciples of Jesus who have been 
baptized into his paschal mystery and filled with his Spirit and who live 
faithfully as his body in this world”—is the context in which the full and 
adequate meaning of the Bible emerges, the authoritative voice in 
conflicts of interpretation, and the primary addressee of the Bible as 
revelatory text.24  This reciprocal relationship grounds a proper 
understanding of the way in which tradition functions in biblical 
interpretation. 
Schneiders contends that the role of tradition is essential because of 
the very nature of the interpretation of foundational documents.  She 
explains the role of tradition through the use of an analogy developed by 
Hans-Georg Gadamer:  
the singularly enlightening analogy between legal hermeneutics in 
relation to the foundational documents of a civil society and 
biblical hermeneutics in relation to the foundational texts of 
Christianity.25 
Schneiders draws on this analogy in order to clarify the reciprocal 
relationship that exists between a community’s foundational experience, 
the community’s written formulation of its self-understanding, and the 
community’s ongoing task of interpreting the foundational text. 
As Schneiders understands it, the life of a political community like 
that of the United States grows out of the experience of its founding 
 
 24. Sandra M. Schneiders, The Revelatory Text: Interpreting the New Testament as Sacred 
Scripture 64 (2d ed., Liturgical Press 1999). 
 25. Id. at 66.  See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method 324-341 (2d rev. ed. 1994).  See 
also Linell E. Cady, Hermeneutics and Tradition: The Role of the Past in Jurisprudence and 
Theology, 79 Harv. Theological Rev. 439 (1986). 
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generation.  That founding generation concretizes its self-
understanding—its “basic vision, values, and essential beliefs”—in the 
constitutional text.  By committing this foundational experience and 
self-understanding to writing as fundamental law, “the society and its 
experience become subject to the foundational vision and experience as 
preserved in the written documents of foundation.”26 
But, Schneiders argues, the fundamental law must be capable of 
reinterpretation as the community moves forward in history.  Otherwise, 
the foundational constitutional text will “become a musty relic either 
totally irrelevant to ongoing life or rigidly obstructive of the very 
societal experience it was formulated to promote.”27  While the whole 
political community has a role to play in the ongoing interpretive 
enterprise of bringing the foundational text into interaction with the 
ongoing life of the community, it makes sense to designate a subset of 
the community (for example, lawyers, judges, and constitutional 
scholars) as “special (though not independent or unique) agents of that 
community task.”28  This ongoing process of interpretation (which gives 
rise to case reports and scholarly literature) eventually produces what 
Schneiders understands as “tradition”: “a normative body of community 
experience that is rendered relatively permanent in various ways and that 
functions with the foundational documents in the successive moments of 
interpretation.”29 
Similarly within the life of the Church, tradition finds its source in 
a foundational experience: the Christian community’s experience of 
Jesus of Nazareth as Savior, handing over the gift of shared life with 
God through the Holy Spirit that unites the community as the Body of 
Christ in the world.  The apostolic witness to that foundational 
experience of divine self-gift in Jesus interprets and brings to expression 
that experience in a way that mediates the experience of the original 
event to a community extended in time.  Some of that witness took 
written form, which the community recognized and acknowledged as 
adequate and sufficient, though not exhaustive, witness to the 
foundational experience.30 
Schneiders explains that this written witness, the New Testament 
scriptures, has a certain priority within the apostolic tradition because it 
is written.  When speech is captured in writing, it becomes fixed in a 
 
 26. Schneiders, supra n. 24, at 66. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 76-77. 
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way that allows it to serve as a stable norm of interpretation.  As a fixed 
text, the scriptural witness to the apostolic tradition functions as norm of 
the subsequent development of tradition.  Tradition develops as the 
experience of divine self-gift unfolds in the life of the community, and 
the community may gain new insights into what that tradition means.  
The New Testament as norm ensures that tradition as it develops 
remains in continuity with the foundational experience of the 
community. 
At the heart of all valid preaching of the Gospel in every age is the 
“apostolic faith,” that is, the Christ-event as it was experienced by 
his disciples in Jesus of Nazareth.  And the touchstone of 
authenticity, the norm by which to test for the continuity of faith, 
is the apostolic tradition itself normed by the New Testament.31 
Schneiders, like Pelikan believes this normative role of the New 
Testament is analogous to the role played by written texts in relationship 
to the ongoing national tradition rooted in the foundational experience of 
the United States.  The Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, 
and the “official collateral literature” (like the Federalist Papers) become 
the touchstone of fidelity for the authenticity for later developments in 
American life.  The authoritative founding documents allow us to 
identify and justify later developments as “true developments of the 
American tradition rather than subversions of it.”32 
In order to serve as norm for ongoing development in community 
life, the scriptural witness must be interpreted, and Schneiders insists 
that tradition—the ongoing life of the community constituted by the 
text—has a role in that interpretation.  The Church acknowledged the 
texts received into the New Testament canon as “the uniquely privileged 
written formulation of apostolic tradition,” and thus the Church, “by its 
own operation . . . created and established the norm of its own 
tradition.”33  Because scripture is produced as part of tradition and as 
witness to tradition, it can only function as a norm when interpreted 
within the tradition. 
Who is responsible for this interpretation?  The community as the 
whole body of the faithful, each of whom is recipient of the gift of the 
Holy Spirit, possesses the primary role in the work of interpretation.  
But, Schneiders acknowledges, within the Church, some formal 
provision must be made for authoritative interpretation.  Not all 
 
 31. Id. at 78. 
 32. Id. at 81. 
 33. Id.  
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believers are equally prepared for the task of interpretation, so the 
Church needs biblical scholars, preachers, and teachers, as well as 
pastoral authority overseeing and integrating the interpretive efforts of 
believers, scholars, and ministers of the Word in order to ensure 
continuity in a unified tradition. 
Schneiders again draws on the legal analogy to illustrate this point, 
comparing the dialectic relationship between the community of believers 
and the authoritative interpretive role of the teaching office of the 
Church to that of the relationship between the civil community as whole 
and the Supreme Court.  All citizens have a role in carrying the 
principles of the republic into daily life, with lawyers, judges, and 
constitutional scholars having a particular interpretive responsibility 
within the life of the republic.  The Supreme Court, in turn, serves as the 
final court of appeals that  
is really necessary if a large and diverse community is to achieve 
and maintain an ongoing consensual fidelity to its foundational 
vision by means of the interpretive reactualization of its 
foundational documents.34 
C. Cruxes of Interpretation and the Interpretive Imperative 
As they carry out their official responsibility to offer binding 
interpretations of the normative text, Pelikan observes that the 
hierarchical interpreters in both traditions frequently have been forced to 
take up the sort of passage that Scripture scholars have described as a 
crux interpretum—“a difficulty which it torments or troubles one greatly 
to interpret or explain.” (38)  In the face of the issues and ambiguities of 
interpretation posed by such texts, those who seek to make sense of the 
text are charged with what Pelikan characterizes as an interpretive 
imperative.  They must interpret the normative text, and they are 
expected to get it right.  The various interpretive communities in both 
traditions “have long taken [this interpretive imperative] with utmost 
seriousness as the mission statement that validates their very existence.” 
(40) 
Yet the very need to interpret itself has been a crux interpretum.  
Why can’t we just read the words of the text and give them their plain 
meaning?  The Protestant Reformation, for example, gave rise to claims 
that the institutional interpretation of Scripture should be replaced by 
“the simple sense of an uninterpreted sola Scriptura.” (45)  In response, 
 
 34. Id. at 85. 
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Catholic and Orthodox Christians insisted on an ecclesial role in the 
interpretation of Scripture. 
Pelikan notes that this anti-interpretive tradition of Anglo-
American Protestantism influenced early constitutional hermeneutics.  
But, Pelikan explains, 
[I]t soon became clear . . . that neither in Protestantism nor in the 
early American Republic would it be possible to maintain the 
oxymoron of an “anti-interpretive tradition of interpretation,” 
because the experience of textual interpretation in every 
community demonstrates that the only real alternative to 
hermeneutics is bad hermeneutics. (48) 
The proper method of interpretation to be applied to the normative 
text has also been a crux interpretum.  Ambiguous texts give rise to 
multiple interpretations.  Such texts lead Pelikan to pose an inescapable 
question: How are we to prevent the process of interpretation from 
degenerating into a “freewheeling” and “capricious” “Humpty-Dumpty 
textual manipulation” which substitutes “the ipse dixit of the court for 
the authority of what Justice Byron Raymond White called ‘textual 
support in the constitutional language’ itself?” (49)  Is there some 
purpose given by the interpretive process itself that can guide the 
process in a way that isn’t capricious or simply a reflection of purposes 
that the interpreter brings in from outside the process?35 
Drawing on the motto of eighteenth-century exegete Johann 
Bengel—“Apply yourself totally to the text, apply its total content to 
yourself” (52)—Pelikan suggests that normative texts may in fact have 
an internal structure and purpose that can, at least to some extent, guide 
the interpreter, apart from the “interests, difficulties, or enthusiasms” 
(53) that the interpreter brings to the text.  The commentary tradition 
among both scripture scholars and constitutional lawyers exemplifies 
this sort of meditation on the text in an effort to discern “the internal 
order governing the development of the text and the arrangement of its 
parts.” (53)36  
 
 35. See (50, 52) for Pelikan’s criticism of Posner’s suggestion that we haven’t learned much 
about interpretation other than the fact that “interpretation is always relative to a purpose that is 
not given by the interpretive process itself but that is brought in from the outside and guides the 
process.” (50). 
 36. The stated purpose underlying Thomas Aquinas’ commentaries on the books of the Bible 
was  
“[T]o treat the text, not by reference to the reader’s own interests, difficulties, or 
enthusiasms, even if they are inspired by his faith, but rather according to the internal 
order governing the development of the text and the arrangement of its parts.”  
Especially in the law, this method of study commends itself as a way of understanding 
any monumental text of jurisprudence. 
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Pelikan suggests that Justice Hugo Black’s stance toward the 
constitutional text—always available in his pocket for meditation—
might embody this sort of careful, on-going, clause-by-clause meditative 
search for guidance in the text itself.  In Black’s words: 
Th[e] Constitution is my legal bible; its plan of our government is 
my plan and its destiny my destiny.  I cherish every word of it, 
from the first to the last, and I personally deplore even the slightest 
deviation from its least important commands.  I have thoroughly 
enjoyed my small part in trying to preserve our Constitution with 
the earnest desire that it may meet the fondest hope of its creators, 
which was to keep this nation strong and great through countless 
ages. (55)37  
Pelikan concludes the first half of his essay by pointing to several 
interpretive ambiguities shared by both texts—including the ambiguity 
that is inherent in the symbolic nature of language.  For example, Justice 
Felix Frankfurter’s observations “could apply equally to either text”:  
[I]n dealing not with the machinery of government but with human 
rights, the absence of formal exactitude, or want of fixity of 
meaning, is not an unusual or even regrettable attribute of 
constitutional provisions.  Words being symbols do not speak 
without a gloss. (61)38 (emphasis added) 
D. Christian Scripture and American Scripture: Fundamentally 
Different? 
In the midst of all these similarities between Christian Scripture 
 
(53) (quoting Marie-Dominique Chenu, Toward Understanding Saint Thomas 250 (A.M. Landry 
& D. Hughes trans., H. Regnery Co. 1964)). 
 37. Quoting Hugo Black, A Constitutional Faith 64, 66 (Alfred A. Knopf 1968).  Note that 
Black’s statement, which he himself labeled “a confession of my articles of constitutional faith,” 
“could have come from a champion of biblical literalism.” (55). 
 38. Quoting Rochin v. Cal., 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).  Pelikan notes that Chief Justice John 
Marshall similarly  
put his exegesis into the context of a comprehensive theory of language and semantics, 
which would be applicable to the biblical no less than to the constitutional text: “Such is 
the character of human language, that no word conveys to the mind, in all situations, one 
single definite idea; and nothing is more common than to use words in a figurative 
sense.” 
(105) (quoting McCulloch v. Md., 17 U.S. 316, 414 (1819)).  See also (44-45) (“the thickness of 
legal meaning” makes the need of interpretation a crux interpretum) quoting Robert M. Cover, 
“Nomos” and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 19-25 (1983)).  Other shared interpretive ambiguities 
include the lack of any textually explicit prescription for a correct method of interpretation, 
questions within both traditions regarding the propriety of supplementing the text with some 
concept of natural law, and ambiguity within both law and theology with respect to the identity of 
the specific entity holding the authority to provide a definitive interpretation of the normative 
Scripture. 
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and American Scripture, Pelikan also wants to draw our attention to one 
“fundamental difference” between the two texts: “the Bible is meant to 
be prayed and believed, and only therefore acted upon.  This is so 
because the church defines itself by its liturgy: lex orandi lex credendi, 
‘the rule of prayer is the rule of faith.’” (15)39  
This fundamental difference should lead us to ask questions with 
critical importance to the enterprise of constitutional interpretation: Does 
a similar rule, rooted in the experience of the life of the community 
constituted by the text, provide normative guidance for constitutional 
interpretation?  Is the movement from inspired Christian Scripture to 
Christian doctrine an apt analogy for the movement from politically 
crafted constitutional text to judicial decision?  Or, does the religious 
character of the biblical text make the interpretation of that text 
something intrinsically different from constitutional interpretation?  And 
finally, does the political nature of the constitutional text make the 
interpretation of that text fundamentally different from biblical 
interpretation?  For example, does the constitutional community’s 
(rarely exercised) power to amend the text through a political act 
inevitably give rise to interpretive dynamics that are intrinsically 
different from those that govern interpretation of the revealed scriptural 
text?  These are questions to which Pelikan’s book provides no explicit 
answer. 
II. SENSUS LITERALIS IN CORRELATION WITH SENSUS PLENIOR: THE 
ORIGINALIST IMPULSE AND THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT 
Chapters Three and Four of Pelikan’s essay explore a critical issue 
marking the history of both interpretive traditions: how ought the 
interpreter understand the relationship between the authority of the 
original text and the authority of developing doctrine in the ongoing life 
and history of the community?  Both traditions, for example, recognize 
that “there must be a ‘spirit’ that is present within—and yet that 
somehow lies beyond—the ‘letter’” of the text. (76)40  Accordingly, 
 
 39. Citing Pelikan, Credo, supra n. 2, at 166-178.  See also Kaveny, Response, supra n. 12, at 
57: “No matter how flawed in her institutional manifestation, the church is and will remain a 
mystery, the body of Christ, and the gateway to eternal life—something that no legal or political 
tradition, however perfect, could ever hope to be.” 
 40. Citing 2 Cor 3:6: “[God] has made us competent to be ministers of a new covenant, not of 
letter but of spirit; for the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life.” (NRSV).  See also (108), quoting 
John Marshall Harlan, dissenting in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883):  
“It is not the words of the law but the internal sense of it that makes the law: the letter of 
the law is the body; the sense and reason of the law is the soul.” . . . .  By this I do not 
mean that the determination of these cases should have been materially controlled by 
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genuine interpretation of both American Scripture and Christian 
Scripture has required the interpreter “to go beyond the sensus literalis41 
to find the sensus plenior, the ‘fuller meaning.’” (79)  Both traditions 
allow for “analogical extensions” in order to apply a particular text to 
previously unforeseen situations. (79) 
At the same time, both traditions have recognized that there are 
risks involved in the search for the sensus plenior.  At some point, 
interpretive creativity can lead to “interpretations” without foundation in 
the normative text.  The Christian tradition has included attempts to 
broaden biblical authority “by appeal to alleged ‘unwritten traditions,’” 
(84) while the constitutional tradition has seen the Supreme Court 
exercise constitutional authority on the basis of  
alleged “penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees 
that help give them life and substance,” which, “while . . . not 
expressly included,” are “necessary in making the express 
guarantees fully meaningful.” (81)42  
Pelikan notes that, within both traditions, attempts to rely perhaps too 
heavily on the claimed sensus plenior of a text have led to calls for 
interpretation to be restrained by “the higher judgment of primitive 
authority, original intent, and the sensus literalis.” (84) 
A. The Sensus Literalis and the Originalist Impulse 
The Reformation originalist impulse, for example, stemmed from 
the conviction that Christ’s doctrine should be recovered in its native 
form, because that native form was thought to be the purest form.  For 
the reformers, this native form possesses authoritative purity, because it 
is closest to the authoritative sacred events giving rise to the Christian 
community: the life, teaching, death, and resurrection of Jesus.  The 
Protestant rejection of tradition in the name of sola Scriptura thus gave 
heightened standing to “the original and authentic Scripture in its sensus 
 
considerations of mere expediency or policy.  I mean only, in this form, to express an 
earnest conviction that the court has departed from the familiar rule requiring, in the 
interpretation of constitutional provisions, that full effect be given to the intent with 
which they were adopted. 
 41. Pelikan insists that the sensus literalis should not be taken to mean “the literal sense,” or 
“the literalistic sense,” but signifies “the original intent of the passage.”  For example, Pelikan 
asks, what is “the original intent and sensus literalis of the petition” in the Lord’s Prayer asking 
for “our daily bread”—is this simply a petition for bread?  Luther, “a vigorous advocate of the 
sensus literalis,” held this petition to mean “everything required to satisfy our bodily needs.”  
Luther was answering the question, “What does this mean?” to pray for daily bread, not merely 
“What does the term ‘daily bread’ suggest to you by free association or according to a spiritual 
sense?” (77) (emphasis in original). 
 42. Quoting Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
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literalis.”43 
For example, early nineteenth-century Protestant theologian 
Thomas Campbell,44 argued that his approach to Scripture reflected the 
desire to allow the interpreter to “come fairly and firmly to original 
ground upon clear and certain premises and take up things just as the 
apostles left them . . . disentangled from the accruing embarrassment of 
intervening ages.” (88)45  Simply by changing one word—apostles to 
framers—Pelikan asserts that “Campbell’s motto would summarize 
equally well the originalist impulse as applied to the Constitution.” (88) 
B. Sensus Literalis in Correlation with Sensus Plenior 
Still, Pelikan explains, the originalist impulse in interpretation, 
whether biblical or constitutional, presents its own set of risks.  Reliance 
on the originalist impulse alone “runs the constant danger of substituting 
pedantry for living experience,” (98) raises difficult questions of how to 
recover the authentic original meaning, and may direct us to privilege a 
historical record that is “‘at best ambiguous, [with] statements . . . 
readily be[ing] found to support either side of the proposition.’” (99)46  
Thus, in the history of both biblical and constitutional interpretation,  
alongside the authority of their original charters and in continuous 
interaction with that authority, the ongoing and cumulative 
interpretations of the Great Code in the form of tradition and 
precedent have come to occupy a privileged position of authority 
in their own right. (115) 
Within the interpretive community formed by the Christian 
Scriptures, Pelikan argues that this continuous interaction or correlation 
between text and tradition as authoritative norms can be seen in the 
 
 43. Within modern Catholic theology, the originalist impulse plays an important, if not 
exclusive role.  Pelikan calls attention to the Second Vatican Council’s Dogmatic Constitution on 
Divine Revelation, Dei Verbum, which: 
stressed the authority of “the original texts of the sacred books,” and urged that “if the 
interpreter of Holy Scripture is to understand what God has wished to communicate to 
us, he must carefully investigate what meaning the biblical writers actually had in mind; 
that will also be what God chose to manifest through their words.” 
(114) (quoting Dei Verbum, emphasis added by Pelikan).  For the text of Dei Verbum see Vatican 
Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents 750-765 (Austin Flannery, O.P. ed., new 
rev. ed., Costello Publg. 1975). 
 44. See Michael Sink, Comment, Restoring Our Ancient Constitutional Faith, 75 U. Colo. L. 
Rev. 921, 937 n. 59 (2004) characterizing Thomas Campbell’s Declaration & Address (1809) as 
the beginning landmark of the primitivist American Restoration movement. 
 45. (Emphasis in original). 
 46. Quoting Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 
(1963).  Brennan’s “critique[ ] could apply to the authority of original intent in the interpretation 
of Christian Scripture as well as of American Scripture.” (99). 
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decrees of the early ecumenical councils.  As successive councils 
articulated creedal affirmations and doctrinal definitions, they 
consistently insisted on their continuity with what had gone before. 
The Council of Ephesus, for example, which declared the propriety 
of acknowledging Mary as Theotokos, Mother of God, asserted that its 
statement of faith should not be understood as an “addition,” but rather 
“in the manner of a full statement, even as we have received and possess 
it [the faith] from of old from the Holy Scriptures and from the tradition 
of the holy fathers.” (116-117)  Similarly, the Third Council of 
Constantinople declared that it was “following without deviation” all of 
the things taught by the five earlier “holy and universal councils,” to 
which “this holy and universal council of ours has also, in its turn, under 
God’s inspiration [theopneustōs], set its seal.” (117)47  
Pelikan’s life-long study of the development of Christian doctrine 
leads him to conclude that, “in one form or another, the relation between 
continuity and change has been a central concern of Christian thought 
from the beginning.”48  The Church’s ongoing experience of life in the 
Spirit requires doctrinal development—“precisely in order to 
preserve . . . continuity”49 with the revelation made manifest in the 
scriptural text. 
Thus, for example, the Church’s lived experience eventually 
demanded the articulation of the central Christian doctrine of the Trinity 
(which does not emerge fully formed directly out of scripture itself): 
[I]t is the events of the history of the church from the first century 
to the fourth century—missionary growth, persecution and 
martyrdom, apostasy and sainthood, orthodoxy and heresy, 
discipline and worship, and the consolation of the Holy Spirit in 
life and in death—that provide a kind of “database”50 
from which the Church drew the resources it used to affirm in the 
Nicene Creed the full divinity of Son and Spirit with the Father in the 
triune oneness of God. 
The Nicene Creed emerges as an interpretive development 
generated by a scripturally rooted theological controversy.  Readers of 
Interpreting the Bible and the Constitution might better appreciate 
Pelikan’s discussion of the developmental dynamic of continuity-in-
 
 47. Theopneustōs is “the technical New Testament term for divine inspiration (2 Tim 3:16) 
that had originally been applied to the Old Testament Scriptures.” (117). 
 48. Pelikan, Credo, supra n. 2, at 18. 
 49. Id. at 28. 
 50. Id.  See also id. at 31: “[T]he spiritual experience of the Church is also a form of 
Revelation[,]” quoting Georges V. Florovsky, The Eastern Fathers of the Fourth Century 156 
(Notable & Academic Books 1989). 
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change that is driven by the correlation between sensus literalis and 
sensus plenior in light of the following extremely abbreviated account of 
the development of Trinitarian doctrine.51 
The scriptural foundation that the early Church inherited from 
Judaism proclaimed the oneness of God: “Hear, O Israel: The Lord our 
God is one Lord.”52  Indeed, the Creed grows out of that “ancient 
confession of faith” of Israel,” as the Christian community “struggle[d] 
to place a new experience of God through Jesus and the Holy Spirit in 
the church within a longer story, which is . . . everywhere 
presupposed.”53  Within that longer story of God’s relationship with 
Israel, the experience of the Christian community given expression in 
the New Testament scriptures witnessed to the gift of salvation offered 
to humanity through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. 
Yet the scriptural language that the early Church used to express its 
experience of Jesus was itself ambiguous.  Some texts, for example, can 
be read to express strong claims about the divinity of Jesus.54  At the 
same time other scriptural texts can be read in a way that characterizes 
Jesus as a creature with a position subordinate to the Father.55  By the 
fourth century, a priest from Alexandria named Arius had popularized a 
version of Christian teaching which stressed these latter texts.  Arius 
understood Jesus as a creature; an exalted creature with a uniquely 
privileged role in salvation, but a creature nonetheless.  The controversy 
provoked by Arius thus exposed significant tension in a Christian 
community striving to hold together a set of foundational principles: (1) 
God is one, (2) only God can offer definitive salvation to humanity, and 
(3) Jesus is the source of salvation and the risen Lord who is properly 
worshipped as God by the grateful community.56 
This tension bore fruit in the doctrinal development articulated in 
325 in the Creed composed by Council of Nicea, which had been called 
in response to the Arian crisis.  The Nicene Creed begins with words 
 
 51. For a helpful, brief account of this doctrinal development, see Luke Timothy Johnson, 
The Creed: What Christians Believe and Why It Matters (Doubleday 2003) (especially pp. 103-
132, 216-235). 
 52. Deut 6:4 (RSV). 
 53. Johnson, supra n. 51, at 72.  See also id. at 12: “[T]he specific character of the Christian 
experience of Jesus made it necessary to alter the Shema [Deut 6:4] and, with it, the story of God 
and God’s people.” 
 54. See e.g. John 1:1-18; John 10:30. 
 55. See e.g. Prov 8:22; Mark 13:32; John 14:28; Acts 2:36; Rom 8:29; Col 1:15; Heb 3:2.  
See also Johnson, supra n. 51, at 131. 
 56. Cf. Johnson, supra n. 51, at 132: “[I]t remains important to deny that the Son is a creature, 
for at stake is the reality of salvation.  Is it God who saves us in Jesus or not?  The creed says yes, 
Arius said, no, not exactly.” 
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that affirm Christianity’s continuity with Deuteronomy 6:4, “We believe 
in one God.”  The Creed then goes beyond the literal text of the New 
Testament by drawing on the Greek philosophical concept of 
“substance” in order to explicitly affirm the full divinity of Christ and 
the triune oneness of God.  Jesus Christ is affirmed as “the only-
begotten Son of God, Begotten from the Father before all time, Light 
from Light, True God from True God, begotten not made [one in Being 
with] of the same substance as the Father.”  Finally, the Spirit is 
affirmed as “Lord and Giver of life,” to be worshipped “with the Father 
and the Son.”57 
Continuity is thus maintained between both the community’s 
scriptural affirmation that “the Lord our God is one Lord” and the 
community’s experience of salvation from God through Jesus and the 
gift of the Spirit (as expressed in the New Testament scriptures) by 
means of a new, extra-scriptural doctrinal formulation that creatively 
emerges from the tension.  The Council of Nicea’s understanding of the 
texts of scripture in light of the experience of the Christian community 
produces an official interpretation of scripture that can only be 
understood as a creative doctrinal development—affirmation of the 
triune oneness of God. 
Therefore, the Nicene response to the Arian controversy supports 
Pelikan’s assertion that it is sometimes the unwillingness to grow 
beyond the literal text that produces infidelity; it is the “failure to 
recognize that the tradition of divine revelation is a living reality and a 
dynamic force, driven by the Holy Spirit as ‘lordly and life-giving,’ . . . 
[that] produces heresy.”58  Pelikan thus concludes that  
there is obviously a radical change, but . . . a no less demonstrable 
continuity, from the confession of the oneness of God voiced in 
The Shema of the Book of Deuteronomy to the confession of the 
triune oneness of God formulated 
in the Nicene Creed.59  Continuity and change are not only 
noncontradictory; “they are to be seen as mutually supportive and as 
mutually affirming.”60 
 
 
 57. For the text of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, see Johnson, supra n. 51, at 37-38. 
 58. Pelikan, Credo, supra n. 2, at 28 (quoting the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed). 
 59. Id.  See Deut 6:4 (“Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God is one Lord.”) (RSV). 
 60. Id. at 28-29.  See also id. at 31: 
[T]he mystery of creedal continuity and the mystery of creedal development—and the 
mystery of how there can be both continuity and development—are to be interpreted 
dialectically, in the light of the doctrine of the person of Christ, confessed by the 
councils and in the creeds, as the exemplar both of continuity and of change. 
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Pelikan’s immersion in this creedal manifestation of the need to 
change in order to preserve continuity allows him to recognize that the 
struggle to preserve continuity in the midst of change is part of the 
constitutional tradition as well.  He calls attention, for example, to 
Charles Evans Hughes drawing on John Marshall’s reminder that “it is a 
constitution we are expounding,” (118)61 not a narrow legal code.  
Marshall’s insight allows Hughes to argue that “it is no answer . . . to 
insist that what the provision meant to the vision of that day it must 
mean to the vision of our time.” (118)62  Marshall and Hughes seem to 
recognize that there is something in the nature of a constitution as a 
foundational normative document that calls for openness to changes in 
meaning in light of changes in “the vision of our time.” 
C. The Idea of Development: Acknowledging Change-in-Continuity 
An authoritative body of doctrine, whether announced by a Church 
council or by the Supreme Court, unquestionably “grows” over time.  
Yet “growth” is a word possessing an ambiguity of its own.  How do we 
know whether a growth is malignant or benign?  How do we know that 
the doctrinal “growth” that interpretation can produce actually conforms 
to the interpretive imperative to “get it right” when engaged in 
interpretation? (119) 
This critical question leads Pelikan to call upon the idea of 
development articulated by the nineteenth-century theologian, John 
Henry Newman.  Pelikan invokes Newman’s work to assert that “the 
only way for the Supreme Court or a Church council to defend a growth 
as not malignant but benign has been to show that ‘an inner dimension 
of tradition’ . . . is in fact ‘the idea of development.’” (119)63  
 
 
 61. Quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407. 
 62. Quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-443 (1934). 
 63. Quoting Yves M.J. Congar, Tradition and Traditions: An Historical and a Theological 
Essay 211 (Michael Naseby & Thomas Rainborough trans., Macmillan 1967).  Newman thought 
of development  
as the opening out of the aspects of an “idea” which retains its original meaning through 
different historical forms.  With Newman—not that he was the only one, but he was and 
remains to this day the locus classicus for the question—the idea of development became 
an inner dimension of [the idea] of tradition.  He made a decisive contribution to the 
problem of the relationship between magisterium [i.e., the church’s ongoing authority to 
teach] and history in tradition. 
Cf. Joseph E. Capizzi, For What Shall We Repent? Reflections on the American Bishops, Their 
Teaching, and Slavery in the United States, 1839-1861, 65 Theological Stud. 767, 768 (2004): 
“Doctrine develops, and one responsibility of the theologian is to scrutinize church teaching and 
make necessary distinctions between development and departure.  The notion of doctrinal 
development entails a notion of doctrinal continuity.” 
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Newman contended that doctrinal increase, variation, and 
expansion “are the necessary attendants on any philosophy or polity 
which takes possession of the intellect and heart, and has had any wide 
or extended dominion”: 
[F]rom the nature of the human mind, time is necessary for the full 
comprehension and perfection of great ideas; and . . . the highest 
and most wonderful truths, though communicated to the world 
once for all by inspired teachers, could not be comprehended all at 
once by the recipients, but, as being received and transmitted by 
minds not inspired and through media which were human, have 
required only the longer time and deeper thought for their full 
elucidation.  This may be called the Theory of Development of 
Doctrine. . . .64 
Newman explained that the lived implications of an idea—for 
example, the rights of man65—only emerge through the community’s 
experience of living with that idea over time.  Initially “there will be a 
time of confusion, when conceptions and misconceptions are in conflict, 
and it is uncertain whether anything is to come of the idea at all.”66  As 
the community continues to live with the idea, “judgments and aspects 
will accumulate,” and “[a]fter a while some definite teaching 
emerges.”67  The implications of the idea “will be gradually wrought 
out,” and, the idea will, 
in proportion to its native vigor and subtlety, introduce itself into 
the framework and details of social life, changing public opinion, 
and strengthening or undermining the foundations of established 
order.  Thus in time it will have grown into an ethical code, or into 
a system of government, or into a theology, or into a ritual, 
according to its capabilities; and this body of thought, thus 
laboriously gained, will after all be little more than the proper 
representation of one idea, being in substance what the idea meant 
from the first, its complete image as seen in a combination of 
diversified aspects, with the suggestions and corrections of many 
minds, and the illustration of many experiences.68 
Thus, through encounter with the world and with competing ideas, 
through controversy and trial and error, a “great idea is duly . . . 
understood” and “fully exhibited.”69  Through all of this, the idea may 
 
 64. Newman, supra n. 14, at 67. 
 65. Id. at 72. 
 66. Id. at 73. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 73. 
 69. Id. at 75. 
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need to change “in order to remain the same”; in order to be faithful to 
itself in changed circumstances.70  “In a higher world it is otherwise, but 
here below to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed 
often.”71 
Pelikan contends that the notion of “development of doctrine” 
seems to have become a “quasi-technical term in the study of the 
Constitution.” (120)  While citing a number of legal scholars in support 
of this claim,72 Pelikan surprisingly did not make reference to the work 
of John T. Noonan, Jr. at this point in his essay, even though the body of 
Noonan’s work manifests a profound appropriation of Newman’s idea of 
development. 
For example, explicitly drawing on Newman’s Essay, Noonan has 
argued that the concept of development is key to understanding the work 
of the Supreme Court in relation to the free exercise of religion: 
In the course of time Christian doctrine has undergone many shifts 
and turns and is noticeably expanded from its evangelical form.  
How account for the changes?  By supposing that the process has 
been one in which an idea or set of ideas have had their 
implications worked out, with the basic or dominant idea gradually 
driving out ideas incompatible with that dominant idea’s mastery; 
or to put it in less Hegelian terms, human beings in conflict have 
come to see that commitment to certain basic principles excludes 
accommodations and deviations once accepted as normal.  So, for 
example, Christianity has gone from endorsing slavery to 
abhorring it, all as a firmer grasp of the central commandment of 
charity has been had.  Something similar has happened, and is 
happening, in the realm of free exercise.73 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  Some variations are consistent “with identity in political and religious developments,” 
while others are inconsistent; “[t]herefore ‘one cause of corruption in religion is the refusal to 
follow the course of doctrine as it moves on, and an obstinacy in the notions of the past.’” (125) 
(quoting Newman, Essay on Development, supra n. 14, at 179). 
 72. See (120) & (176) (referencing Robert Bork’s invocation of Newman).  See Robert H. 
Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 352 (Free Press 1990); and 
the appearance of the idea of “development of doctrine” in the work of Edward Levi and Donald 
Gianella.  See Donald A. Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal 
Development, Pt. II; 81 Harv. L. Rev. 513 (1968); Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal 
Reasoning 14 (U. Chi. Press 1949). 
 73. John T. Noonan, Jr., The Tensions and the Ideals, in Religious Human Rights in Global 
Perspective: Legal Perspectives 603-604 (Johan D. Van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., M. 
Nijhoff Publishers 1996).  See also John T. Noonan, Jr., A Church that Can and Cannot Change: 
The Development of Catholic Moral Teaching (U. Notre Dame Press 2005); Symposium, God, the 
Person, History and the Law: Themes from the Work of Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., 1 U. St. 
Thomas L.J. 1 (2003), including several essays discussing Noonan’s approach to development of 
doctrine; John T. Noonan, Jr., Experience and the Development of Moral Doctrine, in The 
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Newman sometimes used organic images to describe development:  
This process . . . by which the aspects of an idea are brought into 
consistency and form, I call its development, being the 
germination and maturation of some truth or apparent truth on a 
large mental field.74 
Pelikan notes that, in both theology and constitutional law, the term 
“development” has been used as “a more ‘organic’ metaphor to describe 
doctrinal change.” (120) 
The Christian tradition, for example, sometimes characterized the 
reality of change as development in the sense of a progressive unfolding 
of revelation under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.  God’s people 
gradually grew into the capacity to receive the revelation of God’s self 
as Father, Son, and Spirit.  Consider Gregory of Nazianzus’ description 
of one dimension of the development of Trinitarian doctrine.  While the 
Old Testament proclaimed the Father and the New Testament 
manifested the Son, 
[n]ow the Spirit himself dwells among us, and supplies us with a 
clearer demonstration of himself . . . that by gradual additions . . . 
the light of the Trinity might shine upon the more illuminated.  For 
this reason it was, I think, that he [the Spirit] gradually came to 
dwell in the disciples, measuring himself out to them according to 
their capacity to receive him. (120-121)75  
Pelikan sees an analogous notion of organic development in the 
following description of constitutional interpretation from Justice 
Holmes: 
When we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, 
like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they 
[the words of the Constitution] have called into life a being the 
development of which could not have been foreseen completely by 
the most gifted of its begetters.  It was enough for them to realize 
or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a 
 
Catholic Theological of America Proceedings of the Fifty-Fourth Annual Convention vol. 54, 43, 
43-46 (Michael Downey ed. 1999); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Lustre of Our Country: The 
American Experience of Religious Freedom 209-210 (U. Cal. Press 1998). 
 74. Newman, An Essay on the Development of Doctrine, supra n. 14, at 73 (emphasis added). 
 75. Cf. (78-79): “‘[W]hile the whole law is spiritual, the inspired meaning is not recognized 
by all, but only by those who are gifted with the grace of the Holy Spirit in the word of wisdom 
and knowledge,’” quoting Origin, On First Principles 1.8, in Creeds, supra n. 2, at vol. 1, 64-65; 
and 79: “‘[T]he carnal man, the slave of the letter, is incapable by himself of deciphering this [the 
need to preserve the Old Testament in the Christian canon because it contains the type of 
Christ] . . . .  Christ himself must grant that spiritual understanding.’” quoting Jean Daniélou, 
From Shadows to Reality: Studies in the Biblical Typology of the Fathers 282 (Wulstan Hibberd 
trans., Newman Press 1960). 
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century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to 
prove that they created a nation.  The case before us must be 
considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in 
that of what was said a hundred years ago. (121)76 (emphasis 
added) 
Even this argument invoking development and experience, though, 
is subject to what Pelikan characterizes as a “textualist” qualification.  In 
the same opinion quoted above, Justice Holmes concluded that “[t]he 
treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be found 
in the Constitution.” (121)77  
The use of organic imagery to describe development should not, 
however, be understood to imply that the process of development always 
(or usually) involves the gradual unfolding of an idea as it inevitably 
progresses towards its full elaboration.78  Newman, Noonan, and Pelikan 
all recognize the conflictive and often chaotic way in which doctrine 
develops in actual practice. 
Newman, for example, insisted that the development of an idea “is 
not like an investigation worked out on paper, in which each successive 
advance is a pure evolution from a foregoing.”79  Instead, development 
emerges out of “the warfare of ideas” as human beings argue about the 
implications of the idea in light of their insights and experience: 
[Development] is carried on through and by means of communities 
of men and their leaders and guides; and it employs their minds as 
its instruments, and depends on them while it uses them . . . .  This 
it is that imparts to the history both of states and of religions its 
specially turbulent and polemical character.  Such is the 
explanation of the wranglings, whether of schools or of 
parliaments.  It is the warfare of ideas under their various aspects 
striving for the mastery. . . .80 
This understanding of development clearly informs John Noonan’s 
reading of the U.S. Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence.  The 
results of the Court’s work “inspected closely, appear chaotic.”81  But 
the idea of development can help us to see what is happening.  “By trial 
and error, by exaggeration and careful qualification, by broad 
declarations and hairsplitting distinctions, by retreats and reaffirmations, 
 
 76. Quoting Mo. v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Kaveny, Response supra n. 12, at 61, critiquing a crude organic growth model of 
development. 
 79. Newman, Essay on the Development of Doctrine, supra n. 14, at 74. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Noonan, Tensions, supra n. 73, at 603.  
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human beings in conflict are developing doctrine.”82 
While the movement of the Court’s free exercise precedents since 
1940 might generally be in the direction of protecting religious freedom, 
Noonan cautions that “no institutional guarantee has been given that the 
movement will continue or be uninterrupted.”83  Pelikan draws a similar 
insight—which he suggests is “even more true of developments in 
biblical interpretation by councils, synods, and confessions” than it is of 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution—from Edward H. 
Levi: “‘The development proceeds in shifts; occasionally there are 
abrupt changes in direction.’” (124)84  
D. Authentic Development and Interpretative Fidelity 
Pelikan characterizes authentic development of theological 
doctrine—healthy, benign growth within the tradition—as “a faithful 
interpretation of the original deposit in Scripture and even a faithful 
interpretation of the subsequent tradition.” (122)  Thus, the council 
fathers at Vatican II defended their “innovative affirmation of religious 
liberty” on the ground that it reflected “‘the sacred tradition and teaching 
of the church from which it continually draws new insights in harmony 
with the old.’” (122)85  The foundational normative revelation is not 
changed, but what fidelity to that revelation requires of us in light of 
who the revelation has made us to be is made evident through our 
experience.86 
 
 82. Id.  See Noonan, Experience, supra n. 73, at 56:  
These developments [in moral doctrine] would not have occurred without challenges to 
convention, without argument, without conflict, without prayer, without the assistance of 
the Holy Spirit, and without connection with the core constituents of Christianity.  
Experience, raw experience, has not carried the day.  Without experience, however, these 
developments could not have come to be considered or brought to fruition.  
See also Noonan, Lustre, supra n. 73, at 209-210. 
 83. Noonan, Tensions, supra n. 73, at 603. 
 84. Quoting Edward Hirsch Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 59-60 (U. Chi. Press 
1949). 
 85. Quoting the Second Vatican Council’s Decree on Religious Liberty, Dignitatis Humanae.  
For the quoted text of Dignitatis Humanae see Vatican Council II, supra n. 43, at 799.  Dignitatis 
Humanae is drawing on a saying of Jesus found at Matt 13:52, which Pelikan quotes from the 
New English Bible translation, “A teacher of the law can produce from his store both the new and 
the old.” (122) 
 86. Noonan, Experience supra n. 73, at 56:  
[T]here cannot be an endless regress into further experience; some insights are 
primordial, and these are provided or confirmed by the words and the conduct of Christ.  
The revelation is not added to but what it requires is made evident in experience.  As Dei 
Verbum tersely put it: “insight grows into the realities as into the words that have been 
handed on.” 
(citing Dei Verbum, supra n. 43, at 754: “The Tradition that comes from the apostles makes 
progress in the Church, with the help of the Holy Spirit.  There is a growth in insight into the 
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But what does interpretive fidelity look like in the context of 
constitutional interpretation?  What is the original deposit to which the 
interpreter must be faithful—the constitutional text, or the ongoing life 
of the communal “organism” the text constitutes, which inevitably 
grows in ways the framers of the text could not have anticipated?  What 
might it mean for the constitutional tradition to have “the idea of 
development” as an “inner dimension,” in the absence of the guidance of 
the indwelling Holy Spirit?  How do constitutional interpreters reach the 
conclusion that their new insights are in harmony with the old to which 
they are called to be faithful?  How is healthy constitutional fidelity to 
be distinguished from malignant infidelity?  And who is the ultimate 
arbiter of fidelity? 
The recent work of Michael Perry suggests a further critical 
question that theorists of scriptural/constitutional interpretation and 
doctrinal development must address: What sort of stance should official, 
hierarchical interpreters assume with respect to other members of the 
community constituted by the text?  Should official, hierarchical 
interpreters approach their job with an aggressive sense of their own role 
as ultimate decision makers or with a more deferential sense of their 
penultimacy within the community as a whole?  To continue Pelikan’s 
analogy, how much deference should the official, hierarchical 
interpreters give to the interpretive views of “we the people,” whether 
those views are manifest in the consensus fidelium of the people in the 
pews or in the democratic will of the people expressed in the voting 
booth, legislative chambers, and presidential elections?87 
Interpreting the Bible and the Constitution does not take up 
directly any of these questions.  Pelikan’s earlier work on tradition, 
however, suggests that fidelity is not to be realized in definitive answers 
to such questions.  Instead, fidelity for Pelikan lies in the community’s 
ongoing willingness to engage in dialogue over the very issue of what 
authentic fidelity might look like.  In The Vindication of Tradition, for 
example, Pelikan notes that the struggle to acknowledge change while 
preserving continuity will involve ongoing disagreement and 
“unremitting controversy” over the proper path of doctrinal 
 
realities and words that are being passed on.”). 
 87. See Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the 
Courts?, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 635, 679 (2003).  See also Larry D. Kramer, Marbury and the 
Retreat from Judicial Supremacy, 20 Const. Commentary 205, 230 (2003): “Judicial supremacy is 
not the logical or inevitable product of experience and progress.  It remains now, as it was in the 
beginning, but one side in a recurrent and ongoing struggle to determine the proper role of 
ordinary citizens in a republic.” 
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development.88  Indeed, such controversy fuels the scholarly work of 
constitutional lawyers and Church historians. 
Yet, in the face of disagreement and controversy, “the 
demonstrated ability to sustain and eventually to accept the development 
of doctrine is witness to the vitality of a tradition.”89  Pelikan contends 
that the answers to questions about developmental fidelity are to be 
found neither in a historical relativism that denies continuity nor in a 
strict constructionism that “proceeds as though development were not 
real and were only the application of an unchanging and unchangeable 
authority to outward change.”90 
Pelikan recognizes that historical relativism and strict 
constructionism have had (and continue to have) their adherents in the 
interpretive communities of both the Church and the American republic.  
But, Pelikan concludes, 
their accumulated wisdom has taught them to recognize . . . that 
development is real but that it goes on within the limits of identity, 
which the tradition defines and continues to redefine . . . .  
Ultimately, . . . tradition will be vindicated for us, for each of us as 
an individual and for us as communities, by how it manages to 
accord with our deepest intuitions and highest aspirations 
(intuitions and aspirations which, if I am right in what I have been 
saying, are themselves imbedded in the tradition).91 
E. Transformative Appropriation through Dialogue Among Text, 
Tradition, and Community 
Pelikan in The Vindication of Tradition thus suggests that authentic 
development is dependent on a community’s commitment to seek new 
answers to new questions arising from new experiences by struggling 
creatively to bring the resources of text and tradition to bear on those 
questions in ways that maintain the community’s self-identity in the face 
of change.  The work of New Testament scholar Sandra Schneiders 
again provides a complementary elaboration of this developmental 
dynamic. 
Like Pelikan, Schneiders sees doctrinal development in both 
theology and law emerging from an ongoing dialogue between text and 
tradition within the community constituted by the foundational text.  Just 
as Pelikan locates the touchstone for authentic, faithful development in 
 
 88. Pelikan, supra n. 13, at 59. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 59-60 (emphasis added). 
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the intuitions and aspirations embedded in a textually constituted 
tradition, Schneiders argues that a textually constituted community’s 
way of seeing the world and living in the world is changed by its 
ongoing efforts to be faithful to the world called into life by the text. 
The textually constituted community enters into and is transformed 
by the world projected by the text, and “now lives a transformed 
reality.”92  Schneiders describes this experience of understanding as a 
process that can be characterized as transformative appropriation.93  
Understanding in this sense involves the movement from asking, “What 
does the text say?” to asking, “What does the text mean for me and my 
community, and how is this text calling me to live?” 
As a community interprets its foundational text, the community is 
transformed by the world projected by the text and generates a history 
that becomes part of its tradition and experience.  The interaction 
between the text and the consciousness created by that historical 
experience and tradition allows the community to look at its 
foundational text in a new way, drawing its meaning forward even 
though the words of the text have not changed.94 
Schneiders points to the developing meaning of the text of the 
Declaration of Independence as an example of this process.  A written 
text like the Declaration’s phrase, “All men are created equal,” is not 
invariably tied to its original eighteenth-century application to adult, 
white, property-owning males.  Today that phrase is understood to 
include all people: 
The question behind this text is not, Who is equal? but, What is the 
basis of the equality that we acknowledge among men?  The 
answer is, Their humanity.  Consequently, if humanity is 
predicated of others outside the circle of those the framers 
originally had in mind, the affirmation of equality applies to them 
as well, regardless of the limitations in the minds of the framers of 
 
 92. Schneiders, supra n. 24, at 172. 
 93. See e.g. id. at 157, 158-159, 169-178. 
 94. See id. at 161: 
Both jurisprudence and speculative theology have been offered as clarifying instances of 
the “applied” character of true understanding.  One does not really know what a law 
means, that is, one does not really understand it, unless one sees how it functions in 
relation to the case under consideration, which is, of course, not the case in terms of 
which the law was formulated.  One does not understand theologically a datum of faith, 
for example, salvation through Jesus’ death and resurrection, unless one sees what it 
means in terms of the people (including oneself) who inhabit one’s own historical 
situation, which is quite different from the situation in which Jesus’ paschal mystery 
originally occurred. 
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the Declaration.95 
The meaning of the biblical text, in Schneiders’ view, develops in 
the same way, through an ongoing dialogue with the text about its 
subject matter.  The contemporary believer does not simply submit to 
New Testament texts that accept slavery, anti-Jewish polemic, or the 
subjugation of women.  Instead,  
the text has a surplus of meaning that interacts with the historical 
consciousness of contemporary Christians who, partly because of 
their very formation in Gospel values (i.e., because of the effective 
history of the Gospel itself), have come to see the moral 
unacceptability of slavery, anti-Semitism, and patriarchy.96 
Through this sort of dialogue with the text, a text that is as 
“thoroughly human as Jesus himself,” the New Testament text continues 
to serve as a privileged locus of revelatory encounter between God and 
humanity.97  The community’s dialogue about what fidelity to the 
original revelation demands—the community’s ongoing effort to remain 
faithful to the truth of its identity in changed circumstances or in light of 
new (or newly understood) experience—may in fact demand 
development in doctrine. 
F. Notes for Authentic Development 
Interpreting the Bible and the Constitution allows Pelikan to return 
to the idea of development (understood as a tradition’s ability to embody 
continuity-in-change) that he previously addressed in The Vindication of 
Tradition.  The concluding pages of the book suggest that John Henry 
Newman’s Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine can provide 
guidance to those seeking to distinguish a state of authentic or healthy 
development within a tradition from that of corruption or decay. 
Newman’s Essay proposed seven “notes” that might serve as 
criteria illuminating whether or not a doctrinal change can be 
characterized as an authentic development within the tradition rather 
than a corruption of the tradition: (1) preservation of its type or idea, (2) 
continuity of its principles, (3) its power of assimilation, (4) its logical 
sequence, (5) its anticipation of its future, (6) conservative action on its 
past, and (7) its chronic vigor. (124) 
Pelikan credits Thomas Grey for calling attention to the potential 
contribution that Newman’s work might make to our understanding of 
 
 95. Id. at 176. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 178. 
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“the relation between original intent and development of doctrine in the 
interpretation of the United States Constitution.” (124)98  And 
interestingly, Pelikan explains that several of the examples Newman 
himself uses in deploying his various “notes” are drawn from 
developments in law and politics: “some of the most telling observations 
in Newman’s Essay deal . . . with our theme of the similarities between 
theology and jurisprudence as venues for the development of doctrine.” 
(123) 
The closing section of Pelikan’s book guides us through the seven 
notes in an effort to illustrate how each of the notes has served as an 
implicit interpretive tool by the Supreme Court at various point in its 
history.  Pelikan, for example, sees the note of “preservation of its type 
or idea” at work in the Supreme Court’s developing doctrine rooted in 
the phrase “due process of law.” (127)  Pelikan explains that the Court 
long-ago recognized that this phrase brings into the text of the 
Constitution a “type” or “idea” regarding the protection of liberty from 
government usurpation that is itself drawn from Magna Carta.99   
[T]he preservation-and, indeed, expansion-of this type went on to 
bring about, after a long period of relative inactivity, what has 
sometimes been described as a “due process revolution” in the 
twentieth century. (128) 
Yet many jurists and constitutional scholars would certainly 
dispute Pelikan’s claim that the Supreme Court’s reliance on the phrase 
“due process of law” as a source for doctrinal innovation can 
appropriately be characterized as a manifestation of the note of 
“preservation of its type or idea.”  That the Court frequently uses the 
phrase as a textual hook for doctrinal innovation is no guarantee that a 
change in doctrine is a benign growth in the “idea” of “due process of 
law” rather than a corruption of that idea.100 
 
 98. See Grey, supra n. 6, at 8 n. 26. 
 99. See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1856): 
“The words, ‘due process of law,’ were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the 
words, ‘by the law of the land,’ in Magna Charta.  Lord Coke, in his commentary on those words, 
(2 Inst. 50) says they mean due process of law.” (quoted by Pelikan at (128). 
 100. See e.g. Andrew T. Hyman, The Little Word “Due,” 38 Akron L. Rev. 1, 44 (2005): 
“Many scholars and jurists of all political persuasions have expressed doubts about using the Due 
Process Clause to strike down substantive statutes that are subjectivistically undue, and those 
doubts are nothing new.”  See also id. at 8 the Supreme Court has “undermined [the] core 
meaning” of the Due Process Clause by regularly using it to override laws enacted by elected 
representatives; John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale 
L.J. 920, 935-936 (1973) criticizing the Court’s reliance on the Due Process Clause in Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 592-594 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting, criticizing the majority’s due process analysis). 
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Pelikan discusses the note of “continuity of its principles” with 
similar generality.  This note reflects Newman’s conviction that “‘the 
life of doctrines may be said to consist in the law or principle which they 
embody.’” (129)101  Thus, it is because “‘developments in 
Christianity . . . have been conducted all along on definite and 
continuous principles that the type of Religion has remained from first to 
last unalterable.’” (129)102  Pelikan sees this note at work in the Supreme 
Court’s repeated attempts to call upon such “definite and continuous 
principles” in its interpretation of the Constitution. (129)103  
In Pelikan’s view, Justice Chase articulated a criterion similar to 
Newman’s “continuity of principles” in the following passage from 
Calder v. Bull104: 
This fundamental principle flows from the very nature of our free 
Republican governments, that no man should be compelled to do 
what the laws do not require; nor to refrain from acts which the 
laws permit . . . .  There are certain vital principles in our free 
Republican governments, which will determine and over-rule an 
apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power . . . .  An act of the 
legislature (for I cannot call it a law), contrary to the great first 
principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful 
exercise of legislative authority . . . .  The general principles of 
law and reason forbid [certain acts of legislation]. (130)105  
Similarly, John Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck106 referred to 
authoritative non-textual constitutional “principles which are common to 
our free institutions.” (129)107  Justice Holmes’ dissent in Lochner v. 
New York108 argued that legislation reflecting majoritarian opinion could 
be declared unconstitutional when “a rational and fair man necessarily 
would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental 
principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people 
and our law.” (131)109  And Justice Cardozo maintained that the Court 
could identify certain rights as constituting “‘the very essence of a 
scheme of ordered liberty, . . . principles of justice so rooted in the 
 
 101. Quoting Newman, An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, supra n. 14, at 
180. 
 102. Id. at 289. 
 103. Id. (explaining that a “quest” for such principles “has been an ongoing preoccupation of 
the Supreme Court.”). 
 104. 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
 105. Quoting id. at 388-389 (emphasis supplied by Pelikan). 
 106. 10 U.S. 87 (1810). 
 107. Quoting id. at 139 (emphasis supplied by Pelikan). 
 108. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 109. Quoting id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added by Pelikan). 
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traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.’” (131-132)110  
The difficulty, however, in relying on the continuity of these 
principles as a criterion capable of distinguishing authentic development 
from doctrinal corruption was long-ago recognized.  Indeed, the 
difficulty was recognized in Calder v. Bull itself, the very case that 
Pelikan points to as an example of Newman’s note of “continuity of 
principles” in action. (130)  Justice Iredell, writing separately in Calder, 
directly challenged Justice Chase’s invocation of non-textual general 
principles of law: 
It is true, that some speculative jurists have held, that a legislative 
act against natural justice must, in itself, be void; but I cannot 
think that, under such a government, any Court of Justice would 
possess a power to declare it so . . . .  If . . . the Legislature of the 
Union, or the Legislature of any member of the Union, shall pass a 
law, within the general scope of their constitutional power, the 
Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their 
judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice.  The ideas 
of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard; the ablest 
and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the 
Court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the 
Legislature, possessed of an equal right of opinion, had passed an 
act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the 
abstract principles of natural justice.111 
There may indeed be a continuity to the Court’s ongoing “quest” 
for such principles.  Yet Justice Iredell’s words suggest that the Court’s 
“ongoing preoccupation” with the quest (129) may not be enough to 
help us discern which doctrinal variations embody continuity with 
fundamental principles and which manifest departure from those 
principles.  In our time, as in Justice Iredell’s, the fight may be over our 
ability to identify the relevant principles themselves, not to mention 
what those principles actually require in particular controversies.  The 
“ablest and purest” of people continue to “differ[ ] upon the subject” in 
many cases.112 
 
 110. Id. at 131-132 (quoting Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)) (emphasis added by 
Pelikan). 
 111. Calder, supra n. 91, at 398-399 (emphasis added).  Pelikan in fact cites Iredell’s opinion 
as evidence of the Court’s ongoing quest for “definite and continuous principles” to guide 
doctrinal development.  See (130) (“James Iredell felt constrained to articulate ‘the general 
principles, which influence me, on this point, succinctly and clearly,’”) (quoting 3 U.S. at 398) 
(emphasis added by Pelikan).  But the “general principles” guiding Justice Iredell are clearly 
somewhat different from those relied upon by Justice Chase. 
 112. Id. 
KALSCHEURREV.DOC 5/18/2006  3:08:27 PM 
134 JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION [Vol. XXI 
G. An Alternative Example of the Note of “Continuity in its 
Principles”: Michael Perry on Constitutional Interpretation 
A more persuasive example of the note of “continuity in its 
principles” working as a guide to fidelity in the midst of development 
might be found in the constitutional theory developed by Michael Perry.  
Interestingly, Perry’s theory exemplifies Pelikan’s insight that the 
interpretation of foundational normative texts involves a correlation 
between the sensus literalis and the sensus plenior, while also 
illustrating how a commitment to the note of “continuity in its 
principles” can provide a foundation for authentic doctrinal 
development. 
1. Michael Perry’s Theory of Constitutional Interpretation 
Perry understands constitutional interpretation as the effort to 
discern and articulate the norm which “We the people” originally 
understood themselves to be communicating through the language of the 
constitutional text.113  This norm underlying the text might be 
understood in Newman’s terms as the principle that takes flesh in 
doctrine. 
Sometimes simply reading the language of the text will allow one 
to discern the norm.  Each state is to have two senators.  The President 
must be at least thirty-five years old.  Sometimes, however, the 
constitutional text does not so clearly identify the underlying normative 
principle that “We the people” understood it to communicate.  Such a 
text, therefore, calls for significant interpretive inquiry if we are to 
determine what directive “We the people” meant to issue through the 
text.  A text that is vague or ambiguous will have to be “translate[d] or 
decode[d]” so that we can identify the normative principle that the text 
represents and communicates.114 
This process requires us to engage in a historical inquiry.  What 
norm was the provision understood to communicate by the generation of 
“We the people” that put the provision into the Constitution?  Thus, the 
objective of the historical inquiry is to learn what norm or principle that 
generation meant to establish—not to establish how that generation 
would have resolved the particular constitutional issue that we are 
interested in resolving today. 
 
 113. Perry, supra n. 10, at 24.  Whose understanding is relevant?  Those who proposed the 
language of the text, those who ratified it, and “We the people” in whose name the language was 
proposed and ratified.  See e.g. id. at 52. 
 114. Id. at 34. 
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How that generation might have resolved our contemporary 
conflict may well be relevant to our interpretive inquiry, because it 
might help us to discern how wide or narrow they believed the norm 
they established to be.  But in the end, what matters for our 
interpretation today is our identification of the norm they established, 
“not what they would have believed to be the correct way of resolving 
(on the basis of their norm) our conflict.”115  Their belief about the 
correct answer to our conflict is not binding on us because “they might 
have been mistaken about the contextual requirements of the norm.”116 
Interpreting the constitutional text tells us what norm or principle 
the applicable textual language establishes, but that norm must then be 
“specified” in the context of a conflict in which the norm is implicated.  
Perry explains that the process of “specifying” a norm in a particular 
context is the process of deciding how an indeterminate norm requires 
us to decide a case.117  A norm is indeterminate when people who agree 
about the relevant facts and the applicable norm can reasonably disagree 
with one another as to how, given the norm, a particular conflict should 
be resolved.  Specifying an indeterminate norm, therefore, challenges 
the judge to decide 
how best to achieve, how best to “instantiate”, in the context of a 
particular conflict, the political-moral value (or values) at the heart 
of the norm; [specification] is the challenge of discerning what 
way of achieving that value, what way of embodying it, best 
reconciles all the various and sometimes competing interests of the 
political community at stake in the conflict.118 
Specification understood in this way is not a process of deduction 
or simple application of a general rule to a specific case; instead it is an 
exercise of good judgment.  Perry calls on Gadamer’s comparison of the 
process of specification in law and theology to illustrate the element of 
creative decision making that is involved in the moment of specification: 
In both legal and theological hermeneutics there is the essential 
tension between the text set down—of the law, or of the 
proclamation—on the one hand and, on the other, the sense arrived 
at by its application in the particular moment of interpretation, 
either in judgment or in preaching.  A law is not there to be 
understood historically, but to be made concretely valid through 
being interpreted.  Similarly, a religious proclamation is not there 
 
 115. Id. at 26. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 28. 
 118. Id. at 29. 
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to be understood as a merely historical document, but to be taken 
in a way in which it exercises its saving effect.  This includes the 
fact that the text, whether law or gospel, if it is to be understood 
properly, i.e., according to the claim it makes, must be understood 
at every moment, in every particular situation, in a new and 
different way.  Understanding here is always application.119 
Thus, specification for Perry seems to be analogous to what Sandra 
Schneiders calls transformative appropriation—how is the world 
projected by the text, the claim made on us by the political-moral value 
embodied in the norm, to be made concrete in the context of a particular 
conflict?120 
Perry notes that in many constitutional cases the Supreme Court 
will have already identified and articulated, in a prior decision accepted 
as authoritative, the norm that a given constitutional text represents.  
Moreover, the process of specifying the applicable norm may already 
have begun in the body of prior precedents which have produced 
authoritative constitutional doctrine with respect to the norm.  Thus, the 
specification of an indeterminate constitutional norm can be understood 
as a “temporally extended process,” which is “analogous to the ongoing 
judicial development of—including the occasional revision of—the 
‘common law.’”121  The challenge of specification then becomes that of 
further developing the existing doctrine—“to shape further the norm that 
is both the warrant for and the foundation of the doctrine.”122 
In sum, Perry’s theory of constitutional interpretation reflects the 
correlation between the sensus literalis and the sensus plenior that 
Pelikan identifies as the inherent dynamic of interpretation.123  For Perry, 
constitutional interpretation involves two different interpretive moments, 
which must be kept analytically distinct.  The first is an originalist 
moment of interpreting the constitutional text—the effort to discern 
what norm or principle the text represents.  Here, the relevant question 
is, “What norm was this provision understood to communicate by the 
‘We the people’ whose representatives put the provision into the 
 
 119. Id. at 198, n. 60 (quoting Gadamer, supra n. 25, at 308-309).  See also id. at 29: 
[A] court asked to apply a rule must decide in light of information not available to the 
promulgators of the rule, what the rule should mean in its new setting.  That is a creative 
decision, involving discretion, the weighing of consequences, and, in short, a kind of 
legislative judgment. . . . 
(quoting Richard A. Posner, What am I?  A Potted Plant?, New Republic 23, 24 (Sept. 28, 1987)). 
 120. See text, supra, at Pt. II.A. 
 121. Perry, supra n. 10, at 47. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See text, supra, at Pt. II.B. 
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Constitution?”124  This question must not, however, be confused with a 
different, relevant, but nondeterminative inquiry: How would the 
generation of “We the people” that established the norm have believed 
our conflict should be resolved on the basis of the norm they 
established?125 
The second interpretive moment demands the interpretation of the 
constitutional norm—the effort to give shape to the norm in the context 
of a conflict in which the norm is implicated but indeterminate.  Here the 
note of “continuity in its principles” comes into play.  The interpreter 
must ask, what does it mean for us to faithfully apply—here and now in 
this present conflict—the normative principle represented by the 
constitutional text? 
2. “Continuity in its principles” and Interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment 
What norms did “We the people” establish when they added the 
second sentence of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
constitutional text?  The sentence contains three prohibitions on state 
action: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.126 
What principles did “We the people” understand that configuration 
of words to communicate? 
In order to discern and articulate the normative principles 
underlying the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, Perry investigates the 
historical context that gave rise to enactment of the Amendment, and 
how the language of the text would have been understood within that 
context.  He notes that the enactors of the Amendment aimed most 
directly at constitutionalizing the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which sought 
to prevent the former Confederate states from maintaining the 
subordinate position of the newly freed slaves through institutionalized 
 
 124. Perry, supra n. 10, at 34. 
 125. Perry contends that it is “wildly implausible” in our political-legal culture to think that 
those who enact legal texts (especially constitutional texts) would understand themselves to be 
intending that all conflicts under the norm they are establishing should be resolved just as they 
would have resolved them; this “is an implausible construal of what many legal norms are taken to 
be—even by those who establish the norms.”  Perry, id. at 31. 
 126. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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discrimination in the form of “the infamous Black Codes.”127 
Perry maintains that each of the three prohibitions in section one of 
the Fourteenth Amendment addresses one of the basic ways in which 
state actors were seen to be oppressing ex-slaves and others.  The text of 
the provision, however, was framed in language broad enough to 
indicate that it was understood to communicate norms transcending the 
particular historical circumstances that led to the Amendment’s 
enactment.  Perry’s review of the historical record and the extensive 
literature interpreting that record leads him to conclude that this text 
communicates a fairly complex set of norms: 
—a due process norm 
[No state actor] shall damage or destroy a person’s life, liberty, or 
property extrajudicially or otherwise “outside the law.” . . .  [S]tate 
actors may deprive a person of life, liberty, or property, if at all, 
only pursuant to “due process of law,” which, whatever else it 
might have been understood to refer to, was understood to refer to 
the process of law that, under state law, is due ordinary 
citizens . . .128 
—an equal protection norm 
[S]tate actors [are required] to give every person within the state’s 
jurisdiction the very same protection (“equal protection”) that, 
under state law, is due ordinary citizens . . ., the same protection 
“of the laws.”  What laws?  At a minimum, laws designed to 
protect life, liberty, or property . . .  Relatedly, the equal protection 
norm . . . also forbids states to make or enforce protective laws that 
are themselves racially or otherwise invidiously discriminatory.129 
—a privileges or immunities norm 
No state may make or enforce any law that denies to some of its 
citizens, or otherwise lessens or diminishes their enjoyment of, any 
protected privilege or immunity enjoyed by other of its citizens, if 
the differential treatment 
(1) is based on a view to the effect that the disfavored citizens are 
not truly or fully human—that they are, at best, defective, even 
debased or degraded human beings; or 
(2) is based on hostility to one or more constitutionally protected 
choices; or finally, 
(3) is otherwise not reasonably designed to accomplish a legitimate 
 
 127. Perry, supra n. 10, at 50. 
 128. Id. at 81. 
 129. Id. 
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governmental purpose.130 
Perry recognizes that, as we look back on the historical record, 
different participants in the enactment process may seem to have 
different ideas about precisely what the proposed constitutional text 
might mean in practice.  Both “We the people” and their representatives 
may have experienced confusion “about precisely what norm was being 
established.”  In the face of that confusion, how ought we to proceed as 
we seek to identify the norm represented by the text? 
The interpreter’s task is to try articulate the norm that best captures 
what “We the people” and their representatives were trying to do.131  
Perry believes that the complex set of norms he has articulated best 
reflects “the various concerns that inspired” the enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and “best captures the fundamental point or 
trajectory of [the] antidiscrimination project” undertaken by “We the 
people.”132  This complex norm, moreover, can be articulated as a 
constitutional antidiscrimination principle: 
Whatever else section one was meant to do, it was meant to 
achieve and protect, against the states, a fuller measure of equality 
for a particular group of Americans, a group that had long been 
regarded and treated as less than truly, fully human.133 
While the history of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
crucial to the process of discerning and articulating the 
antidiscrimination principle established by section one of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, today that principle may well have implications that run 
contrary to the expectations and understandings of “We the people” who 
enacted the provision.  One can be mistaken about the implications of a 
constitutional principle to which one is committed.  Thus fidelity to the 
principle may require doctrinal development, and such a faithful 
development will be marked by “continuity in principle.” 
For example, “We the people” in 1868 would not have understood 
their antidiscrimination norm to call into question governmental 
distinctions on the basis of sex.  Yet, when we are faced with a 
constitutional conflict requiring us to specify the Fourteenth Amendment 
norms in the context of sex discrimination, we are not bound by their 
understanding of what their principle requires.  We have to give shape to 
the norm in a particular context based on our understanding of what the 
norm requires today. 
 
 130. Id. at 76. 
 131. Id. at 74-75. 
 132. Id. at 76. 
 133. Id. at 84. 
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We can see, in a way that the generation that gave us the 
Fourteenth Amendment could not, what faithful continuity in principle 
demands of us.  We can see that discrimination against women often 
denies the full humanity of women.  We are, thus, obligated to specify 
their norm in a way that acknowledges this reality.  Perry thus espouses 
a constitutional theory that includes a significant originalist moment, but 
that necessarily allows for considerable development in the way in 
which constitutional principles are specified in new contexts over time.  
“Continuity in principle” will be the mark of faithful development; the 
interpreter strives to apply the original principle with fidelity in new 
contexts, even when that might require the principle to be applied in 
ways in which its framers would not have expected. 
H. Pelikan’s Understanding of the “Notes” of Faithful Development—
Only Useful in Retrospect? 
In what will certainly be a source of frustration to lawyers and 
judges taking up Pelikan’s work, the essay concludes in a fashion which 
suggests that the notes of faithful development might be of more use to 
the historian of doctrine than they will be to a judge who must make a 
decision in a particular case.  As Pelikan describes them, the notes seem 
to emerge from the historian’s retrospective search within a tradition for 
evidence of continuity in the midst of change.  As such, they may not 
provide much help to a judge faced with the present task of deciding 
which of a number of possible interpretations of a constitutional text 
would most faithfully carry the tradition into the future.134 
This retrospective character of Pelikan’s utilization of Newman’s 
notes is most evident in his concluding elaboration of the note of 
“chronic vigor,” where Pelikan turns to the opening words of the 
American Scripture, “we the people.” (148-149)  He asserts that, even 
though “the content of ‘we the people’ has shifted” through the course of 
the life of the American republic, “the authority of ‘we the people’ has 
continued and grown.” (148) 
It is, moreover, retrospective appreciation of the chronic vigor of 
the constitutional system of “we the people” that Pelikan takes as the 
mark of faithful development.  He brings his essay to a close by 
applying to the community constituted by American Scripture the words 
that Newman used to describe the Catholic Church: 
 
 134. Cf. (124), where Pelikan explains that Newman’s “tests” or “notes” are, “in Owen 
Chadwick’s phrase, ‘rather pegs on which to hang a historical thesis than solid supports for a 
doctrinal explanation.’” 
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When we consider the succession of ages during which the 
[constitutional] system has endured, the severity of trials it has 
undergone, the sudden and wonderful changes without and within 
which have befallen it, . . . it is quite inconceivable that it should 
not have been broken up and lost, were it a corruption [ . . . .]  Yet 
it is still living, if there be a living [. . .] philosophy in the world; 
vigorous, energetic, persuasive, progressive; . . . it grows and is 
not overgrown; it spreads out, yet is not enfeebled; it is ever 
germinating, yet ever consistent with itself. (149)135  
The touchstone of faithful development is thus creative change that 
preserves identity: “ever germinating, yet ever consistent with itself.” 
CONCLUSION 
Pelikan’s elegantly elaborated analogy fails to provide much 
specific guidance to lawyers and judges looking for answers to 
contemporary constitutional questions.  Moreover, his provocative 
suggestion that broad implications flow from examining the parallels 
between official interpretation of scripture and official interpretation of 
the Constitution (36) prompts a host of questions that remain unexplored 
in this book.136  Yet the experience of looking at interpretation through 
the theology-and-law lenses of Pelikan’s binoculars does bring the 
character of the interpretive process into sharper focus.  Pelikan helps us 
to see more clearly that the process of interpreting texts which give rise 
to living communities might best be understood as a sort of 
developmental originalism that ought to manifest creative fidelity. 
The goal of the enterprise of interpreting foundational normative 
texts—whether in the Church or in the American political community—
is creative fidelity to the text in the midst of the change inevitably 
generated by the ongoing experience of the community given life by that 
text.  The interpretive imperative to realize faithful continuity-in-change 
calls the interpreter both to be sensitive to an originalist moment in 
interpretation and open to allowing the lived experience of the 
community to shed new light on the text.  Faithful interpretation thus 
demands an ongoing correlation between the sensus literalis and sensus 
plenior of the foundational text. 
The creative tension generated by the correlation between the 
sensus literalis and the sensus plenior, and by the reciprocal relationship 
between the foundational text and the tradition that is generated by the 
 
 135. Quoting Newman, Essay on Development, supra n. 14, at 378. 
 136. See text following supra n. 39, and text following supra nn. 86 & 87. 
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text and embodied in the lived experience of the community founded 
upon the text, will produce development in doctrine.  The challenge 
facing the interpreter is thus to answer a question inherent in the 
enterprise of interpreting foundational, normative texts.  Is a proposed 
interpretation of the foundational text an authentic, healthy development 
or a malignant corruption—is this interpretation a manifestation of 
continuity-in-identity within the community given life by the text, or is it 
evidence of decay and decline? 
Pelikan does not offer the constitutional interpreter a definitive 
roadmap leading directly to the resolution of difficult interpretive 
questions in particular cases.137  Yet, in the end, Pelikan’s binocular 
interpretive vision does help to focus our attention on the central 
question with which official interpreters striving for creative fidelity 
must wrestle if a living community constituted by a foundational 
normative text is to endure: Is the proposed textual interpretation an 
authentic, healthy development manifesting creative continuity-in-
identity, or is it a malignant corruption of the identity of the community 
given life by the text? 
 
 137. Indeed, in the midst of the developmental interpretive process, it might not be entirely 
clear where the path of fidelity ultimately leads.  See Noonan, Lustre, supra n. 73, at 209-210: 
“But do I know how it [i.e., the developmental process] will turn out or where I am in 
it?” . . . .  “Remember,” Cleo said, “what Madison said, that Free Exercise was ‘an 
experiment.’  You’re part of the experiment.  You do have two hundred years of 
experience and some notable examples to guide you . . . .  You can be confident that 
your voice and example will advance the experiment.  The very incoherencies you and 
your advisors have encountered are opportunities for creative improvement.” 
